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“Stricken to Silence”: Authoritative Response, Homeric Irony, and 
the Peril of a Missed Language Cue1
Andrew E. Porter
The Formula
 The formula2  “Thus he spoke, but they  in fact all were stricken to silence” (ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἳ 
δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν  ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ)3  occurs sixteen times in Homer4  and has received 
significant treatment in a number of recent studies focusing on its referential force. Its 
“connotative level of signification” (Kelly 2007:6) has been projected in part for the Iliad, and 
important themes and functions have been suggested. Silvia Montiglio (1993:175-78) has 
considered the formula’s meaning within the Iliad both etymologically and more generally, and 
found that it suggests “une rupture anormale,” “la déchirure” of the normal communication 
process. John Miles Foley has linked the formula in the Iliad with the speech that  precedes it, 
since “each initial speech proposes or reports a radical, usually unexpected action” (1995:13) that 
promises either the winning or losing of kleos. Foley’s research further demonstrates that the 
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1 I wish to thank my anonymous external reviewers along with Casey Dué, Scott Garner, David Mulroy, 
and Kevin Muse for their remarks on earlier drafts of this article.
2  I employ the term formula to speak of recurring words or traditional idioms,  in an exactly equivalent 
metrical arrangement, allowing for a change in verbal number or substantive case (or even of other, lesser 
component parts).  I also speak of formulaic phrases, lines, or systems, as patterns of words with one or more 
important parts repeated as component(s), but with a varying amount of replacement of parts within the system. It is 
agreed generally that a formula must recur at least once to be considered as such (cf. Hainsworth 1968:42, 
Finkelberg 1986:1, Olson 1995:224-27), but the strongest conclusions can be drawn from formulae, such as 
“stricken to silence,” that recur a great many times.  Kelly (2007:10) works with a minimum of three in his 
referential commentary on Book 8 of the Iliad.  William Merritt Sale (1993:101) calls a formula repeating fewer than 
six times an “infrequent formula.” My definition is not meant, however, to deny the existence of formula flexibility 
of the type noted by J. B. Hainsworth (1968).
3  All translations throughout are my own, and are meant, in as much as is reasonable, to match the 
traditional cola of the Homeric line. The chief resource for cola research was the TLG database (http://
www.tlg.uci.edu). Quotations follow the texts of M. L. West (1998, 2000) and Peter Von der Mühll (1962), without 
the formatting practice of indentation, that, although welcome as a break for the reading eye, sometimes (like book 
divisions) obscures the formulaic junctures of the text. (For example, compare Il. 7.403-5 with 9.693-95.)
4  Il. 3.95, 7.92, 7.398,  8.28, 9.29, 9.430, 9.693, 10.218, 10.313, 23.676; Od. 7.154, 8.234, 11.333, 13.1, 
16.393,  20.320. Foley (1995:25) considers two related silence phrases that fill other cola. I employ “Homer” (or 
“Homeric”) throughout to stand for the Iliad and Odyssey as texts or for the preliterate oral poet (or aoidos, “epic 
singer”) who sang each one. I will say more about my assumptions of a “poet” in due course. 
formula leads, immediately or inevitably, to the “qualification if not dismissal of the proposed or 
reported action” (15) that precedes the silence formula. Raymond Person (1995) uses 
conversation analysis to suggest that  the formula marks that a speaker will follow with a 
“dispreferred response,” essentially a response that  is delayed and mitigated. Adrian Kelly’s 
study (2007:85-86) of the formula in the Iliad highlights the relationship between the speech that 
immediately precedes the formula and the speech that ensues, in terms of agreement or 
disagreement.5 
 The formula’s employment in the Odyssey has been less easy  to demarcate.6  The present 
study will suggest a reading that  spans both the Iliad and the Odyssey. I will argue that the real 
heart of the formula is in what it cues in the action of the narrative that follows for the external 
audience attending the poetic rendition. It points to the immediately  ensuing speech as 
authoritative in setting the subsequent narrative trajectory. In the two exceptions, where the 
formula’s cue is not followed in the narrative that ensues, I will argue that the poet is being 
ironic. The poet uses metonymic irony of narrative perspective to heighten tension and create 
suspense in especially  central narrative moments. Our consideration of the “stricken to silence” 
formula begins, after a review of traditional referentiality, with a consideration of its fourteen 
regular occurrences, followed by the two instances of its ironic employment, one in each epic. 
Traditional Referentiality, Metonymy, and Text 
 As John Miles Foley has shown, Homeric formulae contain meaning that extends well 
beyond their simple function as metrically convenient integers.7 Meaning is found not primarily 
in the individual contextual setting of a singular instance of a formula, but through interpreting 
the instance in connection with its repeated usage elsewhere in the tradition, with formulae being 
the product of generations of performance. In short, formulae are traditional, and when used, 
must be read by “reference” to their use within the tradition, a process of metonymy, whereby the 
“part stands for the whole” (Foley 1991:7).8 The audience informed by  the tradition can in turn 
comprehend the meaning of specific metonyms in the text, because they share a body of 
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5 Kelly’s focus is thus on the preceding speech rather than on the significance of the ensuing speech for the 
subsequent narrative direction, the central point to be addressed in the current essay. 
6  As Foley (1995:20-24) has noted, the qualification theme (cf. Person’s 1995 general category of a 
“dispreferred response”) is consistently present in the Odyssey,  along with the kleos theme in some, but not all, 
cases. 
7  See, for example, Foley 1999, where he demonstrates how traditional lexica, proverbial rules, and a 
sample test case from Odyssey 23 show traditional referentiality in action. Foley (2004) has also successfully 
applied his own methodology in detail to South Slavic epic. A significant application of Foley’s strategies for 
referential readings of Homer in particular has been carried out by Kelly (2007), who has created an impressive 
lexicon of formulaic diction for Iliad 8.  See Foley 1991:1-37 and 1995:7 for other and earlier pioneers in this field. 
See Elmer 2011 for an excellent summary of the present state of the oral-formulaic theory. The impetus for the 
present study derives from consideration of the formula in light of Foley’s research methodologies.
8  A detailed linguistic study of metonymy can be found in various articles in Barcelona et al.  2011. See 
especially its included article by Carita Paradis on the change in semantic field for a metonym. 
knowledge that is their cultural inheritance (45). As David Elmer summarizes the phenomenon 
(2011:605): 
Phrases and formulae function more as metonymic than as purely denotative signifiers, allowing 
the performer to evoke traditional resonances that far exceed the semantic value of his or her 
[individual] words. 
 The foregoing description assumes an audience informed by  a tradition of performance 
shared by  the Iliad and Odyssey. The research of Richard Janko9  supports the impression (for 
example, Hainsworth 1968:42-43, n.1) that both epics likely  represent a common song tradition 
(that they were sung by exactly  the same aoidos [“epic singer”] is perhaps less likely 10) and that 
other early Greek hexameter traditions were memorialized in writing only  later. The question of 
how common the tradition represented by the Iliad and Odyssey is usually becomes acute for the 
researcher whenever there seems to be a difference in the use of a particular formula between the 
two epics.11 In the end, while the question is important, it  cannot be wholly answered a priori. In 
part, the answer will always be related to whether or not we can read a common tradition 
underlying both epics in vocabulary, formulae, themes, type scenes, and other story elements 
(similes, characterization, and the like), no matter what the absolute dating is for the written 
memorialization of each. It is possible that the two epics’ unique and often contrasting narrative 
concerns (Whitman 1958:293, Steiner 2010:1-3) and slightly different temporal origins will 
necessarily generate similarities and differences. Study  of formulae will shed light on the 
relationship  between these two epics and help  us to comprehend their shared, but also dissimilar 
lexica.12 What can be said in the affirmative is that the present study finds a common meaning in 
both epics for the formula “Thus he spoke, but they in fact  all were stricken to silence” (ὣς 
ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ) in fourteen of its sixteen occurrences.13
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9 The changes in epic diction over time are mapped by Janko (1982:47),  and his overall findings support the 
close dates of composition for the Iliad and Odyssey. The neglect of the initial digamma, for example, is put at 
17.2% for the Iliad and 17.9 % for the Odyssey, but at 33.7% for the Theogony and 37.9% for the Works and Days. 
The Homeric Hymn to Hermes sits, unsurprisingly (considering the other indications of its lateness), at 56%. Janko’s 
seminal study is concerned with relative, rather than absolute dating.  See also the earlier comments of Hainsworth 
(1968:42-43, n.1). The date of memorialization in writing is of course a different question than the relative ages of 
the origins of the stories themselves, an important point to remember,  since the Cyclic Epic stories may be earlier 
than the stories contained in Homer’s epics (See Burgess 2006:150 and 2001).
10 West (2011:364), in his review of the “Homeric Question,” notes that most scholars “would now accept 
that the Odyssey is by a different poet from the Iliad,” but we have no way of knowing for sure and this is far from a 
consensus view. Milman Parry’s (1933-35, in A. Parry 1971:444-45) original pondering over the question is still of 
value.
11  The problem of finding a common meaning for formulae within either epic is further complicated by 
possible interpolations of verses or even books. The disputed Doloneia, Iliad 10, contains two instances of our 
formula’s use.
12 Richard Martin’s working principle of providing a grammar for each epic, followed by one for the two 
together, accords well with the approach taken here (1989:14, following G. M. Bolling 1946:343).
13 The two anomalous instances of the formula, at Il. 9.430 and Od. 20.320, will be considered afterwards. 
Authoritative Response: Fourteen Narrative Moments in Homer
 In each of the following fourteen narrative moments from the Iliad and Odyssey, we will 
see that the formula “Thus he spoke, but they in fact all were stricken to silence” (ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἱ  δ’ 
ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν  ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ) follows an initial speech and leads to a speech response that 
acts as the authoritative answer to what has just been said.14  It thus acts as the hinge from what 
went before, but more significantly, functions as a metonymic harbinger or traditional narrative 
cue for the external audience of an ensuing pattern of response. The pattern includes support by 
the group, who accept the reply as authoritative and representative of its own perspective. The 
intent of the speech is carried out in every  case, and the poet’s15  narrative continues forward 
along the trajectory that the narrative cue has set. The poet knows where he is taking the 
narrative moment when he employs this formula, and his audience, informed by the traditional 
cue, also expects what will transpire.
 What occurs immediately after the formula displays a discernible pattern that has the 
following, basic structure: 
Initial Speech (I)—Formula (F)—Authoritative Response (AR)—Group Acceptance (GA)
The foregoing pattern can regularly  include certain additional strategic elements, most notably a 
note of extended delay (D)16  and a speech (or speeches) that confirms (C) the intent and also 
sometimes partly modifies (M) the directive of the authoritative response following the silence 
formula, so that the larger possible pattern would be:
I—F—D—AR—C—M—GA
? We turn now to consider this pattern for each of our key formula’s fourteen occurrences, 
first in the Iliad, then in the Odyssey. 
 1) The “stricken to silence” formula is first employed by Homer at Iliad 3.95, after which 
Menelaus steps forward to offer the authoritative response (3.97-110). Hector has just spoken in 
the space between the Trojans and Achaeans, after Paris reluctantly agreed to fight in a 
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14 Deborah Beck (2005) reminds us that most speeches in Homer are not solitary monologues, but part of a 
conversation, something true of all but one of our formula’s contexts.
15  By “poet” I mean to suggest intentionality in the placement of the “stricken to silence” formula, 
something that moves beyond tradition alone, to the poetic performance and performer working within the tradition, 
cuing his audience as to what lies ahead. I use “poet” to refer to an unknown, preliterate aoidos (Greek epic singer), 
responsible for shaping each epic song as his own. As with the more competent of the guslari (South Slavic epic 
poets), such as Salih Ugljanin, Stanko Pižurica, or Avdo Medjedović (see the CD-ROM of archival material in the 
updated edition of Lord 1960/2000), I assume that the aoidos or aoidoi (Greek epic singers) who gave us the Iliad 
and Odyssey were of exceptional abilities. Having said this, I do not deny that we cannot know exactly what the 
original, dictated (M. Parry 1933-35 in A. Parry 1971:451, Janko 1990, Powell 1997, Haslam 1997:80-84) texts 
looked like (cf. Foley’s [1990:5-8] “oral-derived”); nor did the performance tradition suddenly stop with these 
memorializations, but continued to live on. 
16  The very use of the “stricken to silence” formula, as Montiglio (1993) has suggested, itself creates a 
delay. 
representative duel with Menelaus for possession of Helen herself. The aggrieved husband of 
Helen takes up the challenge, and the Achaeans, “hoping to cease from miserable war” (3.112), 
react with joyful acceptance of his response. The acceptance is understandable, especially  since 
the envisioned outcome would be an immediate end to the conflict through treaty  (3.92-94). The 
shorter pattern I—F—AR—GA is all that the poet deems necessary. Here we find no extra delay 
or further speech confirming or modifying the authoritative reply toward which the formula 
points. 
 2) Our formula next shows up at  Iliad 7.92, a verse whose placement follows the 
narration of Apollo’s plan to turn the tide of battle in favor of the Trojans by stirring up Hector to 
engage in a duel with an unnamed Achaean (7.38-42). The Olympian plan is transmitted by 
divine means to the warrior-prophet Helenus who advises Hector privately. Hector addresses the 
Trojans and Achaeans. While the speech, which includes a challenge to any Achaean to meet him 
in a duel, bears a great affinity  with the duel of Iliad 3 (example 1 above), it is not, as before, 
meant to bring peace or an end to the war, nor is Helen up for grabs. For each Achaean whom 
Hector addresses, it  is rather a question of killing Hector and gaining his armor or being killed, 
dying as a “valorous fighter” (7.73, ἀριστῆες) and obtaining lasting “fame” (κλέος, 7.91). There 
is an added formulaic note of delay (“yet after a delay” [ὀψὲ δὲ δή], 7.94)17  following the initial 
speech and key formula (7.93-95): 
αἴδεσθεν μὲν ἀνήνασθαι, δεῖσαν δ’ ὑποδέχθαι·
ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ Μενέλαος ἀνίστατο καὶ μετέειπεν‧
νείκει ὀνειδίζων, μέγα δὲ στοναχίζετο θυμῷ·
While ashamed to refuse him, they were afraid to take up the challenge;
yet after a delay, Menelaus stood forth and spoke;
scolding them with a reproach, he groaned deeply in his spirit.
 After the extended delay, Menelaus’ authoritative response comes in the form of a neikos 
(“reproach”) speech, and, like other comparable speeches in the Iliad, has as its direct intent the 
shaming of the fearful and hesitating troops into action.18  The first five lines of the speech are 
purposely scornful and hyperbolic (7.96-100):
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17 This line-initial formula ending at the A2 position and employed twelve times in Homer is regularly part 
of larger formulae, including “yet after a delay, he spoke” (ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε),  used seven times in Homer: Il. 
7.399,  8.30, 9.31, 9.432, 9.696; Od. 7.155, 20.321 (with an additional variant form at Il. 7.94). As Kelly (2007:87) 
observes for the Iliad (but I note the same to be true for the Odyssey), this formula is often associated with our key 
formula when it is deployed by the poet and usually indexes “a speech which qualifies or rejects” the prior speech. 
On the colometry of the epic hexameter line, see Fränkel 1955:104, Nagy 1974, Peabody 1975:66-70, Edwards 
1986:4-54, Foley 1990:80-82, Sale 1993, Nagy 2000, and Garner 2011:3-17. Within the current essay, I follow 
Berkley Peabody’s schematization:
?⎯?∪ ∪⏐⎯⏐∪ ∪?⎯⏐∪⏐∪ ⎯⏐∪?∪⏐⎯ ∪ ∪ ⎯?∪
              A1   A2           B1  B2          C1        C2 
18  James Morrison (1992:132, n.18) notes that exhortation to battle can include “advice, criticism, or 
warning” (cf. Il. 2.381-93,  4.223-421, 19.408-17); cf. Schadewaldt 1938:29-40. Louise Pratt (1993:122) and 
Jonathan Ready (2011:54) both conclude that a proper neikos is directed at the “blameworthy,” not “the 
praiseworthy.”
ὤι μοι ἀπειλητῆρες, Ἀχαιΐδες, οὐκέτ’ Ἀχαιοί·
ἦ μὲν δὴ λώβη τάδε γ’ ἔσσεται αἰνόθεν αἰνῶς, 
εἰ μή τις Δαναῶν νῦν Ἕκτορος ἀντίος εἶσιν.
ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε
ἥμενοι αὖθι ἕκαστοι ἀκήριοι, ἀκλέες αὔτως. . . .
Ah me! Braggarts! Women and no longer men!
To be sure your response will be shameful, dreadfully dreadful,
unless now, some one of the Danaans faces Hector.
No, but may you all turn to water and dirt
sitting there, each of you, thus inanimate and bereft of glory.
 Menelaus concludes his berating response by saying that he himself will don armor and 
fight, and after his speech, he begins to do just what he has said. Yet, unlike in Book 3, where 
Menelaus faced the man who had stolen his wife, he now has no intensely personal stake in who 
enters the engagement. There will follow not only a confirmation of his call to action, but also a 
modification: his brother Agamemnon will urge him to allow another to fight: “No, now you sit 
down among the company of your companions / and the Achaeans will raise up  another 
champion to contend with this man” (ἀλλὰ σὺ  μὲν νῦν  ἵζε’ ἰὼν μετὰ ἔθνος ἑταίρων, τούτῳ δὲ 
πρόμον ἄλλον ἀναστήσουσιν Ἀχαιοί. [Il. 7.115-16]).
? Menelaus’ speech is followed not only by the confirming speech (with modification) of 
Agamemnon but also by a further supportive (neikos) speech by Nestor (7.124-60). Now the nine 
foremost Achaean champions stand to answer the call to battle. Even though the Greater Ajax 
will win the glorious right to engage Hector, group  assent is everywhere evident when all the 
foremost heroes’ lots are shaken together in Agamemnon’s helmet (7.175-83). This second 
instance of the “stricken to silence” formula consequently provides an example of the longer 
pattern I—F—D—AR—C—M—GA.
 3) The “stricken to silence” formula next appears at Iliad 7.398. Idaeus, Priam’s 
messenger, has just spoken to the Achaeans by their ships. His message was an offer of partial 
indemnity, that Paris would give back everything (except Helen!) carried off by him from Sparta, 
along with added goods. Idaeus also requested a temporary  truce for the burning of corpses. Our 
key formula follows, made more emphatic with an extended silence (7.399; cf. 7.94), after which 
Diomedes gives the authoritative response denying Paris’ partial offer of indemnity. Complete 
group assent is immediately indicated (7.403-04): 
ὣς ἔφαθ’· οἳ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν,
μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι Διομήδεος ἱπποδάμοιο·
Thus he spoke, and all the all the sons of the Achaeans shouted in assent,
marveling at the authoritative word of Diomedes tamer of horses;
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 Diomedes has remained appropriately silent concerning the request for a truce, something 
not his to grant. Agamemnon’s ensuing speech acts to confirm the response of all the Achaeans, 
which is in reality the authoritative response of Diomedes (see μῦθον in 404 and 406),19  but 
further, to consent to the appeal for time to burn the corpses. 
 4) Iliad 8.28 brings the sole example of the “stricken to silence” formula played out in the 
narrative of the divine assembly. Zeus orders the gods off of the battlefield for the moment, to 
keep  them away from the sort of involvement that the external audience knows is constantly part 
of their activity in the poet’s narrative.20  The move is essential, since the poet  knows from his 
comprehension of this traditional tale that the Achaeans are to be pinned against their ships in 
desperate need of the stubborn-hearted Achilles (something the poet will present  in his rendition 
of the story  in Books 9 to 17). The traditional story line is clearly present in the poet’s mind and 
shaping his narrative. He keeps the gods out of the war, since they might shield the Achaeans 
from their immediate, albeit temporary, “ruin” (οἶτος).21 
 Zeus’ speech includes a threat and is followed by  our key formula. An extended delay 
ensues (8.29-30). The subsequent authoritative response comes appropriately from Zeus’ favorite 
child, Athena, who speaks for the other gods. Her reply is unsurprisingly accepting of Zeus’ will: 
“But of course we shall keep away  from the war” (ἀλλ’ ἤτοι  πολέμου  μὲν  ἀφεξόμεθ’, 8.35). She 
says that she and the other gods will only  offer helpful counsel (8.36).22  While the narrative that 
ensues shows that the group assents to Athena’s speech (which god would openly disobey 
Zeus?), the text does not include the usual retort of the crowd normally  found after the 
authoritative response. Yet, for the moment, and as the ensuing narrative clearly indicates, 
Athena’s word is authoritative for the group  in what follows: the Achaeans suffer in the 
immediate aftermath of Zeus’ decision and no god intervenes as one hero after another leaves the 
battlefield. Zeus has begun to put his plan into action, and without  the gods: “there, wailing and 
victory shouts were heard from men / both from those killing and from those being killed” (ἔνθα 
δ’ ἅμ’ οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχωλὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν / ὀλλύντων τε καὶ ὀλλυμένων, 8.64-65). 
 5) Agamemnon, whose incompetent hegemony is part of the poet’s comprehension of his 
character, provides us with the fifth example of an initial speech leading to the poet’s use of the 
“stricken to silence” formula at  Iliad 9.29. Agamemnon, true to his ambiguous leadership ability, 
opines that Zeus has apparently devised for him an “evil deception” (9.21). He advises the 
Achaeans crowded against  the ships and awaiting the Trojan onslaught at dawn, to flee 
(9.26-28).23 It is a chaotic moment. Would they actually  leave on their ships at night? Would they 
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19  The poet’s use of μῦθος further confirms the group’s acceptance of Diomedes’ speech as the 
authoritative reply. In Martin’s scheme (1989:22), the muth- root here indicates an authoritative command.
20  Most notable in this regard in the Iliad are the actions of Aphrodite, Ares, and Athena in Diomedes’ 
aristeia in Book 5. 
21 This impending ruin will reach its apex in the death of Patroclus (Book 16),  leading to Achilleus’ grief-
driven and vengeful return to battle (Book 20).
22 Here as elsewhere we see that even clear agreement with the speech preceding the “stricken to silence” 
formula is mitigated somewhat in the speech following it, as Foley (1995:11; cf. Person 1995) has shown.
23  As James McGlew has noted (1989:288-89; so also Hainsworth 1993:62), we cannot take Il.  9.9-78 as 
equivalent to the problematic scene in Il. 2.16-440. The exhortation to depart seems quite real.
wait until the morning? Nobody  asked, since all were unable to speak. The extent of the silence 
is evident from the length of the description, three full lines in all, including the hemistich “yet 
after a delay  spoke” (ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε, 9.31) that will mark the response as disagreeing with 
Agamemnon’s suggestion (9.29-31):24
ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ,
δὴν δ’ ἄνεω ἦσαν τετιηότες υἷες Ἀχαιῶν.
ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης·
Thus he spoke, but they in fact all were stricken to silence.
For a long time they were speechless; the sons of the Achaeans were grieved,
yet after a delay spoke Diomedes of the great war cry.
 The authoritative response of Diomedes that ensues upbraids Agamemnon. Even though 
Agamemnon is displaying a decided lack of “courage” (ἀλκήν, 9.34)—Diomedes resolutely 
declares that the son of Atreus can leave—the rest of the Achaeans intend to stay  and fight 
without him until Troy falls (9.42-46). A traditional affirmation by the group (9.50-51) sums up 
the common assent, the very one we saw used in the group response following the formula in 
Iliad 7.398. Nestor, the sagacious counselor,25 adds a confirming speech to the rather impetuous 
tone of Diomedes’ authoritative response. He proposes a feast to enliven the spirits of the men, 
while reminding Agamemnon of his duty  to take charge (9.68-69). While Nestor’s speech does 
not modify  the essence of what Diomedes says, it does mitigate the intensity of the moment. By 
advising Agamemnon to take charge, he is telling him, like Diomedes, that he and the others 
must stay. By suggesting a feast, he creates a conciliatory environment, an expectable outcome 
for the “clear-voiced speaker of the Pylians,”26  whose central task it is “to foster and preserve the 
solidarity of the community” (Roisman 2005:36).
 6) At Iliad 9.693, our formula follows the embassy’s unsuccessful attempt to mitigate 
Achilles’ wrath with appropriate recompense from Agamemnon who has erred. Agamemnon has 
queried the reaction of Achilles to his attempted reparations, and Odysseus’ reply  is the initiatory 
speech before the “stricken to silence” formula is employed. Odysseus addresses Agamemnon, 
rehearsing Achilles’ gravely  disappointing answer that he remains angry and refuses the gifts. 
Odysseus advises that the foremost warrior cannot be forced to rejoin the Achaeans. The news is 
horrible and the reality  of the Achaean situation is embodied in the following silence. The 
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24 Compare example 2 and note 17 above.
25  On Nestor’s wisdom opposed to rash action, see Il. 1.254-84; as a contrast to panic, see Od. 24.54. 
Homer’s extended description at Iliad 4.294-310 (cf. Il. 2.360-68) draws the listeners’ attention to the sagacious and 
balanced preparation that informs Nestor’s leadership style. Note Hanna Roisman’s remarks (2005:36), mediating 
between the poet’s high regard for Nestor and modern scholars’ legitimate reservations about his military ability 
(Kirk 1985:360-61, Postlethwaite 2000:82), that Nestor’s sagaciousness and balance are found in his sustaining the 
values of the community, not in the actual tactics he employs (18).
26 λιγὺν Πυλίων ἀγορητήν. λιγύν in this formulaic phrase includes, as Roisman (2005:24,  n.23) notes,  the 
sense of pleasantness, both “of sound and resonance of voice.” Nestor is first described by this epithet at Iliad 4.293, 
and, although not used here, the epithet would have no doubt been in the audience’s mind. 
“stricken to silence” formula is present, followed by the greatest  number of silence-related 
formulae seen so far, all of which we have encountered already (see 7.403-4, 9.30-31), but never 
concurrently in one locus (9.693-96):
ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἱ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ 
{μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι· μάλα γὰρ κρατερῶς ἀγόρευσεν}·27
δὴν δ’ ἄνεω ἦσαν τετιηότες υἷες Ἀχαιῶν.
ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Διομήδης·
Thus he spoke, but they in fact all were stricken to silence,
marveling at the authoritative word, for he had spoken very strongly.
For a long time they were speechless; the sons of the Achaeans were grieved,
yet after a delay spoke Diomedes of the great war cry.
 This is clearly a desperately hopeless moment in the narrative, and the poet has chosen to 
emphasize it as such by adjoining four full formulaic lines of emphatic pathos before we hear the 
authoritative response from the group’s representative, Diomedes. Diomedes is less congenial 
than the messenger Odysseus. He first reprimands Agamemnon for his attempt at  supplicating 
Achilles, then further advises that they “leave him alone” (9.701). What the troops need now, so 
Diomedes makes clear, is sleep! Agamemnon should then lead them at the break of dawn 
(9.705-09). All are said to “approve” (9.710), “marveling at the authoritative word of Diomedes 
tamer of horses” (711). Each is said to have left for his shelter and slumber (9.712-13).
 7) While the men do as advised by Diomedes, some cannot sleep, at least according to the 
narrative in Book 10, where we find the next two recurrences of our formula. The difficulty with 
assessing the two instances of the formula’s use is of course the thorny question of whether or 
not Book 10 has belonged to the Iliad from the time of its first inscription, or whether it  was 
added later from another epic performance.28 Book 10, whose place in the Iliad is questioned in 
the scholia,29  has been regarded as pedantic and odd at times, and yet there are traditions 
contained in Book 10 that are clearly very  old, such as the Rhesos story (Il. 10.435, on which see 
Fenik 1964). The root of the book’s peculiarities, in fact, may lie in the nature of its controlling 
“ambush” theme as Casey Dué and Mary Ebbott propose (2010; cf. Dué 2010). If their argument 
is correct, then the book’s conventions and idioms only appear peculiar when read without 
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27 Although this line is bracketed in West’s edition and disliked by the Alexandrians, I see no good reason to 
consider it un-Homeric.  Rather, the Alexandrians’  view suggests a failure “to take account of the habits of formular 
composition” (Hainsworth 1993:149; cf. Willcock 1978:284).
28 See Dué and Ebbott (2010:3-29) for a comprehensive overview of approaches to the Doloneia. 
29 The writer of the T scholia (Ersbe 1969-88, vol. 3:0b; cf. Eust. 785.41-45 [van der Valk 1971:2] and Cic. 
De Orat 3.34,  137) reports its tradition as saying that “the lay .  . . was not part of the [original] Iliad, but was added 
to the work by Pisistratus” (τὴν  ῥαψω δίαν . . . μὴ εἶναι  μέρος τῆς ’Ιλιάδος, ὑπὸ δὲ Πεισιστράτου τετάχθαι  εἰς 
ποίησιν).
awareness of this theme.30  As we will note, the regular pattern and implications of the formula 
“Thus he spoke, but they  in fact all were stricken to silence” (ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἱ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν 
ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ) are in fact very much present in Book 10.31 
 The “stricken to silence” formula is found first  at Iliad 10.218 and comes after a 
nighttime assembly  that immediately follows a speech by Nestor. He asks for a volunteer to go 
on a night foray  to reconnoiter Trojan deliberations (10.204-17). Promise is made of fame (kleos) 
and gifts to the man who returns with intelligence. No extended delay occurs before the 
authoritative response of Diomedes, who takes up Nestor’s challenge. In his speech, Diomedes 
says he will go, but that it would instill “more comfort and courage” (10.223) and prove more 
thoughtful for two to undertake the excursion together. No regular assent formula is noted in the 
singular ensuing line (10.227) before the poet offers us the catalogue of heroes that wish to 
volunteer. The overwhelming response of the seven leading warriors, however, makes the point 
that Diomedes’ reply is the will of the group. Agamemnon offers a confirming speech 
(10.234-39), but he adds a caveat as a light modifier, that the Achaean most capable in ability, 
rather than most prominent in social standing, be selected as a partner (10.237-39). Odysseus is 
chosen, and he adds his own short speech (10.249-53) that  the mission be hastened before 
daybreak. 
 8) At Iliad 10.313, we find the key formula employed in the Trojan camp. Hector can 
sleep  no better than Agamemnon! An assembly  is called, and Hector, like Agamemnon, requests 
a volunteer for a reconnaissance mission to learn if their adversaries are keeping guard or 
planning flight.32  The reward for the potential volunteer is then identified: the best horses and 
chariot of the Achaeans (10.305-06). Again, as with the first  passage within the Doloneia, there 
follows the “stricken to silence” formula with no extended delay. There are, however, four lines 
of negative character description (10.314-17) before the introduction to Dolon’s speech (10.318) 
that will act as the authoritative reply to Hector. The poet may wish here, through his inclusion of 
a biographical sketch, to enhance this narrative moment. Like digressions, which effectively “put 
time in slow motion” (Austin 1966:158), and like type scenes, where “Homer expands, curtails, 
and otherwise refashions the details . . . to fit each situation” (Reece 1993:87), these tailored 
lines of characterization slow down narrative time and tighten the narrative focus for the 
audience. 
 Dolon’s reply is ominous, since he agrees to undertake a reconnaissance mission straight 
to Agamemnon’s ship, but nevertheless desirously  and acquisitively  insists on obtaining the 
chariot and team of “the son of Peleus.”33 The poet  and audience may surmise that the prize is to 
be Achilles’ immortal team of Xanthus and Balius, yet Dolon’s actual naming of the hero 
portends his own disaster. (Who goes up against  Achilles and expects to come out unscathed?) 
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30  Such has been the case for Analysts (for example,  Ranke 1881) from early on, but also for more 
contemporary scholars who assume an oral background for the book, such as Georg Danek (1988). 
31 Additionally, a shared pattern associated with our key formula here and in Iliad 23 is considered below 
within the discussion of the later passage.
32 Hector then acts for the poet as Agamemnon’s character doublet. On doublets, see Fenik 1974:172-207. 
33 See Foley 1999:204-21 on the metonymic nature of noun-epithet formulae in Homer. On the history of 
the epithet generally, see Reece 2011.
Dolon even makes Hector swear on his scepter that he will do what he requests, a clear example 
of the folktale theme of a “hasty oath” that usually ends in disaster.34 
 We are not given the usual formulaic assent by the group, but we may be meant to hear 
the fearful assent of the crowd in their silence. There are no detractors in the group, but a short 
confirmation speech given by  Hector acts to endorse Dolon’s doltish offer (10.329-31). Dolon’s 
inherent thoughtlessness is seen, not just in his hasty wish, but also in the poet’s intended 
contrast with Diomedes, his greater doublet who saw safety through acting in concert with 
another. Hector swears what the poet calls a “perjuring” (ἐπίορκος, 10.332) oath, here of an 
unintentional lie, promising what Dolon will never be able to acquire, Achilles’ steeds. Hector is 
unaware of the poet-narrator’s judgment on his oath making. How can Hector know what Fate 
has in store for his doomed respondent? Dolon is sent off on his perilous mission, alone. 
 9) The last instance of the “stricken to silence” formula in the Iliad occurs in 23.676, 
during the funeral games for Patroclus. Epeius addresses his fellow Achaeans and challenges 
them to a boxing match. He defies any man to fight him for a prize, threatening to obliterate his 
opponent in the match. He even claims that his opponent’s friends will have to carry him away 
(23.673-75)! The ensuing formula leads to a response only in action, which does not otherwise 
occur in the passages under consideration. The representative reply comes in the form of 
Euryalus “alone” (23.677) taking up the challenge. The poet makes it clear that his was the 
authoritative response of the group; others are reticent to respond. As in the case of the night raid 
of Book 10, fear must be understood to mitigate their excitement. Another feature common with 
the second narrative moment in the Doloneia (10.314-17) is a four-line biography following the 
response in action (23.677-80). Euryalus loses, however, despite his fine pedigree.
 10) Odyssey 7.154 is the first  occurrence of our formula in that epic. Odysseus has 
washed up  on the island of Phaeacia, met Nausicaa the princess daughter of the reigning royals, 
and been instructed to supplicate her parents by  directly  addressing her mother Arete (6.310-15), 
which he does. Odysseus’ entreaty (7.146-52) includes a reference to his hardships, a wish for his 
patrons’ prosperity, and a request that conveyance home be provided. 
 A note by the poet just before our key  formula pictures Odysseus retiring to the ashes 
(7.153-55):
ὣς εἰπὼν κατ’ ἄρ’ ἕζετ’ ἐπ’ ἐσχάρῃ ἐν κονίῃσι 
πὰρ πυρί· οἱ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ. 
ὀψὲ δὲ δὴ μετέειπε γέρων ἥρως Ἐχένηος.
Thus speaking, he sat down in the hearth in the ashes
by the fire, but they all were stricken to silence.
Yet after a delay, spoke the aged hero Echeneus.
The poet  has expanded the moment of silence just before our formula in line 154. He has 
replaced the first colon (extending to A1) consisting of the familiar “thus he spoke” (ὣς ἔφαθ’) 
with a whole line (153) utilizing an initial participial construction, “thus speaking” (ὣς εἰπών), 
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34 On other hasty oaths, see West 1997:222. 
and followed by the enjambed phrase “by the fire” (πὰρ πυρί; cf. Foley 1995:9) in line 154. The 
initial participle acts to replace the first  part of the formula, something not at all surprising 
considering the less traditionally stable and more ambiguous nature of the first colon.35  The 
whole line and a quarter acts to support the key formula, which is itself followed by the 
traditional note of delay (“yet after a delay,” ὀψὲ δὲ δή, 7.155) that we have often seen 
previously.
 Echeneus’ authoritative response (7.159-66) on behalf of those present seeks to urge 
Alcinous to act  as the community’s leader: to raise the stranger from the dust, to show him 
hospitality, to pour libations, and to respect Odysseus as a suppliant. In the narrative, the assent 
of those present is indicated first by  the poet’s description of the carrying out of Echeneus’ 
advisement, including a meal and libations (7.168-84).36  Alcinous displaces his favorite son 
Laodamas to give his chair to their guest, the servants set up  the feast, and Odysseus eats. 
Following the meal, Alcinous orders libations poured before he makes a speech promising the 
requested conveyance home (7.191-96). Alcinous does all that Echeneus advises in his speech, 
which gains the approval of the crowd (7.226-27). The poet, however, waits to note the crowd’s 
approval until after proper hospitality has actually  been offered and the king has himself made 
known his acceptance of Echeneus’ admonition. 
 11) At Odyssey 8.234, the “stricken to silence” formula follows the pugnacious yet 
graceful reply of Odysseus to the rude testing from his youthful hosts Laodamas and Euryalus, 
who question the veracity  of his intentions and insult his honor (Od. 8.213). Odysseus defiantly 
offers to best any comer except his host  in athletic competition in any area save running 
(8.202-33). Odysseus’ defensive response suggests that he is no scurrilous imposter, but rather 
the heroic Achaean described in his references to retrospective heroic events.37 
 Odysseus’ reply is followed by our formula without any added note of delay. The poet 
next informs us that Alcinous “alone” answers (8.235). To him then belongs the authoritative 
response. Alcinous is conciliatory in what he says. After mitigating remarks about the 
unrepresentative nature of the senseless youth who misspoke, he instead recommends that 
Odysseus see where the Phaeacians really  excel, in areas not referenced by Odysseus in his 
counter-challenge: acrobatics, seafaring, feasting, the lyre, dancing, changes of clothes, hot 
baths, and beds (8.246-49). Odysseus has already  experienced feasting, and now the aoidos 
Demodocus is called forward to sing an amusing story in an effort to lighten the tense mood 
(8.236-55). Alcinous also intends that activities such as dancing and acrobatics should follow, 
along with the offering of gifts to atone for the earlier slight. Even the impetuous Euryalus makes 
amends (8.401-11). There is no formulaic assent, yet assent is portrayed and assumed: the 
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35 It is this least stable colon’s variability that has led to a lack of agreement over the actual positioning and 
existence of the A1 and A2 breaks. (See Edwards 1986:177-85 and Foley 1990:72-84 for a sketch of the 
possibilities.) This and the other formulaic variation bring to mind Hainsworth’s (1968:30-31 and passim) 
observations about formula flexibility and the possibility of “boosting” formula length. Compare the comments of 
Foley (1995:25) about the existence of “multiple phraseological pathways to the same metonymic meaning.” 
36  As Heubeck et al. point out (1988:32), two scenes, the meal and libation, are brought together but the 
close of the meal’s activities does not occur until 7.232.
37  Odysseus has not yet disclosed exactly which Achaean he is, a revelation that finally and intentionally 
finds its moment at Odyssey 9.19.
authoritative response of Alcinous has unquestionably set the trajectory in some detail for the 
subsequent narrative.
 12) Odyssey 11.333 constitutes the next appearance of our formula. Odysseus has just 
finished the captivating story  of his visit to the underworld38  and has concluded with his 
catalogue of women.39  The effect of his speech is noted by  an added formulaic line “And they 
were in a state of amazement throughout the shadowy hall” (κηληθμῷ δ’ ἔσχοντο κατὰ μέγαρα 
σκιόεντα, 11.334), which acts through its descriptiveness to add a momentary  delay  for the poet’s 
own auditors.40 
 The ensuing response of Queen Arete is doubly marked as authoritative, both by the 
preceding “stricken to silence” formula and by  the words employed to introduce what she says: 
“Among these then white-armed Arete began her authoritative response” (τοῖσιν  δ’ Ἀρήτη 
λευκώλενος ἤρχετο μύθων, 11.335). She points out the excellence of Odysseus and bids that the 
Phaeacians not send him away without an appropriate level of honorific gifts from their 
individual possessions (11.336-41). The Queen’s response is quickly supported by representative 
members of the elite gathered for Odysseus’ stories. The respected elder Echeneus advises 
people to obey the Queen’s order (11.344-46), and King Alcinous agrees with his wife’s 
response, supporting her advisement to delay sending off Odysseus until sufficient donations 
have been collected (11.348-53; cf. 339-41). 
 13) Odyssey 13.1, the next instance of our formula, is appropriately placed at  the 
commencement of a new book, since the formula, although responding to what went before, 
more importantly, as we have been noting, sets the trajectory for what follows. Odysseus has just 
completed his enthralling story  with a brief mention of Calypso, the same divinity he references 
at the beginning of his tale at Odyssey 9.29. The very  formula that followed the last instance of 
“stricken to silence” we considered (11.333) is again deployed here: “And they were in a state of 
amazement throughout the shadowy hall” (κηληθμῷ δ’ ἔσχοντο κατὰ μέγαρα σκιόεντα, 13.2, cf.
11.334). This time, however, it is Alcinous who steps in to provide the authoritative response. 
 Alcinous begins by saying that  he thinks Odysseus will not be driven back from making 
his native shore again. Following this rather prophetic note, he charges each of the leading men 
present to provide gifts: clothing, gold, tripod, and cauldron, noting that  a collection can later be 
made among the subjects of the land to restore what has been donated (13.4-15). The internal 
audience’s assent is first noted by the poet  through a formulaic line confirming their agreement, 
including the use of an authoritative command in 13.16: “Thus spoke Alcinous, and to those 
present his command was pleasing” (ὣς ἔφατ’ Ἀλκίνοος, τοῖσιν  δ’ ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος). The 
subsequent narrative describes Alcinous’ proclamation being carried out, beginning with the 
 STRICKEN TO SILENCE 505
38  It is possible, however,  to view this visit instead as a case of necromancy (West 1997:426) or a 
“vision” (Louden 2011:197-221). 
39 Od. 11.235-327. On the Catalogue of Women, see Sammons 2010:74-102.
40 Cf. Od. 13.2 for the full line; for the hemistich beginning at B2, see Od. 10.479, 11.334, 23.299.
King’s own further order that libation and prayer be made for the conveyance of Odysseus home 
to Ithaca (13.50-52).41
 14) Odyssey 16.393 follows a strong speech by Antinous (16.364-92) arguing for the 
murder of Telemachus, who has returned home alive from his voyage to the Peloponnesus after 
the suitors’ failed marine ambush. The suitors have just entered the palace as the “noisy 
throng” (ἀθρόοι, 361) who seat themselves in their own exclusive enclave, allowing neither 
agemates nor elders to join their company (16.361-62). Antinous speaks to this group. In his 
address he warns the suitors that  Telemachus is too capable in counsel and intellect and the other 
citizens are no longer kind to them. In the second part of his speech, introduced by the 
“rhetorical fulcrum” (Foley 1999:224) “but come . . .” (ἀλλ’ ἄγετε, 16.376), Antinous urges his 
fellow suitors to kill Telemachus before he calls an assembly, an act, he argues, that would surely 
prove most disadvantageous to their interests.
 Following the passionately desperate speech of Antinous and the “stricken to silence” 
formula, Homer adduces no extra formulae emphasizing additional delay. The poet has included, 
however, a brief characterizing biography (16.395-98) before the authoritative reply of 
Amphinomus, an option he has used after two other instances of the “stricken to silence” formula 
we have considered to this point.42  The poet’s characterization of Amphinomus through the 
formula “for he had good sense” (φρεσὶ γὰρ κέχρητ’ ἀγαθῇσιν, 16.398) follows a previous note 
that he was more pleasing than others to Penelope in what he said. The formula is used positively 
elsewhere in the Odyssey of Clytemnestra before she was corrupted by Aegisthus (3.266) and of 
the pious actions of the faithful swineherd Eumaeus (14.421) when entertaining the disguised 
Odysseus. The referential import in the use of this traditional idiom consequently seems to 
characterize Amphinomus as a cut above the other suitors. The first hemistich of the last line 
before Amphinomus speaks, “He, being well intentioned toward them, addressed those 
assembled and spoke” (ὅ σφιν ἔϋ  φρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν, 16.399), further suggests 
his reasonable disposition.43  The tenor of the biography (cf. Fenik 1974:192-95, Race 1993:86) 
causes us to expect a mitigating response from this classy  suitor, of whom even Penelope thought 
decently, and we are not disappointed.
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41 The collection of the goods from the common folk to replace what is given by the foremost leaders is not 
within the range of the narrative’s chronology but has clearly been accepted as a guarantee by those responding with 
donations.
42 See Il. 10.313 and 23.676.
43  The second hemistich formula “addressed those assembled and spoke” (ἀγορήσατο καὶ  μετέειπεν),  a 
“boilerplate” (Foley 1999:221-23, 256) introduction, occurs fourteen times in Homer,  beginning at B1, and has “He, 
being well intentioned toward them” (ὅ σφιν  ἔϋ  φρονέων)  in the first hemistich in eleven of those instances. (The 
other traditional possibility for the first hemistich ending at B1, “Then among these Amphinomus” [τοῖσιν δ’ 
Ἀμφίνομος,  cf. Od. 20.244], could not [as is the case also with other names that fit metrically in the alternative 
phrase, but do not end in a long vowel, such as Alcinous and Antinous] have been employed since the second 
hemistich of our present line begins with a vowel.) The eleven instances of “He, being well intentioned toward 
them” (ὅ σφιν ἔϋ  φρονέων) (Il.  1.73: Kalchas, 253: Nestor, 2.78: Nestor, 2.283: Odysseus, 7.326: Nestor, 9.95: 
Nestor, 15.285: Thoas, 18.253: Panthous; Od.  7.158: Echneus,  16.399: Amphinomus, 24.53: Nestor) suggest not that 
“cheery” or “kind” (note the words of Nestor in Il. 1.253), but rather “well intentioned” (so Roisman 2005:31-34, 
espec. 32, n.42; cf. Kirk 1985:78) and perhaps “reasonable” advisement in a speech will follow. 
 Amphinomus’ authoritative reply, which begins less confrontationally with himself as the 
model to emulate, is a negative wish that argues against the suitors’ killing of Telemachus, 
followed by a recognition of the need to pursue some type of rational process for their actions 
(Od. 16.400-05): 
ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἐγώ γε κατακτείνειν ἐθέλοιμι
Τηλέμαχον· δεινὸν δὲ γένος βασιλήϊόν ἐστι
κτείνειν· ἀλλὰ πρῶτα θεῶν εἰρώμεθα βουλάς.
εἰ μέν κ’ αἰνήσωσι Διὸς μεγάλοιο θέμιστες,
αὐτός τε κτενέω τούς τ’ ἄλλους πάντας ἀνώξω·
εἰ δέ κ’ ἀποτρωπῶσι θεοί, παύσασθαι ἄνωγα. 
Friends, I would not be willing to be involved in killing 
Telemachus. It is an ominous matter to go about killing a royal;
rather, first let us inquire what the gods desire.
If the ordinances of great Zeus recommend it,
then I will myself kill and advise all others to do likewise,
but if the gods are opposed, I advise we relent.
 A formulaic hemistich exclusive to the Odyssey, “and to them his advice was 
pleasing” (τοῖσιν δ’ ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος, 16.406),44  along with the group’s immediate actions 
indicate group acceptance of Amphinomus’ response. There will be no thoughtless rush to 
murder Telemachus, as the intent of Amphinomus’ reply makes sure (not that the suitors give 
over considering it: 16.448). There is no speech by  any  other group member, but  the strength of 
the “stricken to silence” cue in normally plotting the immediate story trajectory is perhaps seen 
in the ensuing narrative, where Penelope herself echoes the sentiments of Amphinomus 
(16.418-33). 
 If the foregoing analysis of the “stricken to silence” formula is accurate, then certain 
conclusions can be drawn. The formula represents the inner tectonics of the poet’s plan, inherited 
from the tradition with which he thoughtfully works. Specifically, the formula “Thus he spoke, 
but they in fact all were stricken to silence” (ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἱ  δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν  ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ) 
cues the external audience of each epic that an “official” or “representative” reply  will come, one 
whose intent is normally  acceptable to the group, and which will set the immediate narrative 
direction. The formula then has an idiomatic meaning, and it acts metonymically for the 
informed external audience, who expect it to foreshadow the narrative direction. This formula is 
of course not directly heard by the internal audience, who are not privy to the poet’s authorial 
perspective and the tradition-laden metonym. The internal audience is, however, able to 
recognize the silence as a significant moment, as one that means to call forth from the group an 
authoritative response that it should heed. In each of the fourteen cases we have considered, they 
do just that.
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44 See Od. 13.6, 16.406, 18.50, 18.290, 20.247, 21.143, and 21.269. 
Two Ironic Narrative Moments in Homer
 The metonymic significance of the formula for what follows in each narrative moment 
has been demarcated for both epics. The external audience listening to the poetic performance 
awaits a particular narrative trajectory  in each case, an expectation cued by the “stricken to 
silence” formula. The internal audience, although not privy to the formula, seems, in every case, 
to accept the speech following the (formula and formulaic) silence as authoritative. What 
happens, however, when the internal audience ignores the authoritative speech, and when the 
seriousness of the silence falls on “deaf ears”? What is portended when the language cue does 
not set the narrative trajectory for the external audience, when what should happen after the 
authoritative speech is overcome by the stubborn blindness of a central character or group within 
the story? As we will see in the first  instance, Achilles will not respond to the authoritative 
speech of a surrogate father, despite the pleas of his closest friends, and loses his dearest 
companion as a result. In the second case, the suitors are deaf to warnings and lose their very 
lives. The result  of all these “incongruities” (Muecke 1970:33) between what normally would 
happen and what actually  transpires in these key moments, between the assuming and limited 
perspective of the characters and the more informed and objective perspective of the audience, is 
a sense of irony that operates to harbinger peril.45  We will return to the question of irony, after 
considering the two aberrant examples of our formula’s employment in Homer.
 1) At Iliad 9.430 the first of two missed narrative cues occurs during what is perhaps the 
central moment of the Iliad, the embassy  to Achilles.46  All who have come to Achilles are his 
closest friends in the war against Troy (9.197-204) and all have been suitably  shown hospitality. 
Odysseus has given the opening speech, a long oration meant to persuade Achilles to restrain his 
“great-hearted thumos” (μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν, 9.255)47 and to accept the compensatory offer made 
by Agamemnon to atone for past wrongs (9.225-306). Minimally, Odysseus urges that Achilles 
act out of pity for his friends (9.301-02).
 Odysseus’ speech is followed by Achilles’ long, emotional, and philosophical refusal 
(9.308-429) to provide any immediate assistance, and is accompanied by the “stricken to silence” 
formula. Achilles’ emotional response begins with anger over his lot, in a war fought for a geras-
grabbing commander like Agamemnon. The rhetorical questions of Achilles and his comments in 
toto suggest an entrenched disillusionment. His response to any immediate aid is a firm 
“no” (9.345), even if he experiences some softening of his intractable position (Scodel 1989). 
Achilles’ speech is described by J. B. Hainsworth (1993:101) as “too egotistical to have any 
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45 Irony works on two levels, through both language and situation (cf.  Muecke 1970, Foley 1999:19), as we 
shall see.
46  Donna Wilson’s (2002:71-108) discussion of the embassy to Achilles, while not at every point in 
agreement with my own, highlights the centrality of the embassy in the poet’s presentation. 
47  The traditional way to index a hero’s inner force for vitality.  On the primitive thumos as a separate 
psychic part of a hero’s emotional self, see Snell 1953 and Sullivan 1988. The noun-epithet formula “great-hearted 
thumos” (μεγαλήτορα θυμόν) occurs sixteen times in Homer, always extending from the C1 position to line end. 
(The formula “haughty thumos,” [ἀγήνορα θυμόν]  contains the same “essential idea” [M. Parry 1930:80, in A. 
Parry 1971:272] between the C2 position and line end, found in Od. 11.562; cf. the nominative θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ, 
which is found in the same position in 24 instances).
validity.” It is centered upon himself, and even the short simile of the mother bird (9.323-27) 
provides no relief from the pathos of personal indignation. The intensity of Achilles’ resolution is 
underscored through the poet’s use of anacoluthon, followed by asseveration (9.358-59). Achilles 
is passionate here, and so abruptly breaks away from the normal narration perspective of what he 
was saying, changing in mid-thought to declare emphatically what Odysseus himself will see 
(9.356-9): 
νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐθέλω πολεμιζέμεν Ἕκτορι δίωι, 
αὔριον ἱρὰ Διὶ ῥέξας καὶ πᾶσι θεοῖσιν,
νηήσας εὖ νῆας, ἐπὴν ἅλαδὲ προερύσσω
ὄψεαι. . . . 
But now, since I do not wish to make war against godlike Hector
tomorrow, after having made sacrifices to Zeus and all the gods, 
after loading my ships, when I draw them down to the sea,
you will see. . . . 
This change from an expected construction expresses Achilles’ heated emotional state. The 
asseveration continues throughout his speech, as he fully rejects Agamemnon’s offer of 
recompense piece by piece.
 The meaning of all this forcefully expressive language is clear: he may even head home 
and they are free to watch! And why not, he argues, after the hubristic (ἐφυβρίζω, 9.368) 
treatment he has received from Agamemnon. Achilles continues his tirade of censorious 
statements and hypothetical refusals until, toward the end of his invective, he finally  declares that 
it is his “haughty thumos” (θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ, 9.398)48  and “wrath” (μῆνις, 9.42) that will keep the 
embassy’s plan from succeeding. 
 The “stricken to silence” formula follows this harsh response by Achilles, and joined with 
it are formulaic lines of delay (9.431-32) we have encountered already  in Books 7 and 9, which 
suggest that the respondent will not endorse Achilles’ decision. Adding to the nexus of emotional 
undertones is the descriptive characterization of the closest of Achilles’ companions, who will 
provide what should be the authoritative response. Phoenix, Achilles’ surrogate father, is 
described with an emotionally  charged formula as “having broken out in tears, for he was afraid 
for the ships of the Achaeans” (δάκρυ’ ἀναπρήσας· περὶ γὰρ δίε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν, 9.433).49 
 Phoenix addresses Achilles (9.434-605) by reviewing his own history in retrospect, which 
reminds Achilles and the audience that  he fled from his own home and joined Achilles’, only to 
be made a surrogate parent to the hero, a toddler at the time. Phoenix’s intent seems to be for 
Achilles to accept his authority as a surrogate parent while bringing the crisis of the moment into 
focus by emphasizing certain themes: the need for restraint  when angered and the necessity  of 
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48 See note 47 above. 
49 The first hemistich formula,  “having broken out in tears” (δάκρυ’ ἀναπρήσας), that ends at line-position 
B1 is also used of Telemachus in the Odyssey, who in anger at the suitors’ insolence throws the royal scepter onto 
the ground to the gasps and pity of those assembled (2.81).
accepting supplication. Digressions abound to drive his point home, in what is the longest speech 
of any emissary.50  The supplication is for Achilles to subdue his “great thumos” (θυμὸν μέγαν, 
9.496) and to show pity, before it is too late.51
 Despite the appeals and the presence of traditional formulae cuing what should follow, 
Achilles rejects Phoenix’s call to come and save his closest friends and heroic community 
through responsive action, and to gain honor by accepting gifts that betoken his martial 
greatness. Neither does Achilles’ reply  (9.607-19) offer any real answers to the issues Phoenix 
has raised. Despite Achilles’ rejection, Ajax makes a few parting sallies supporting the tenor of 
Phoenix’s speech, but the effort falls on deaf ears. The embassy leaves in dejection. Achilles has 
held out, and the normal pattern of the authoritative answer setting the narrative trajectory has 
been broken. It is a moment of irony as the implications of what traditionally  follows are muted 
by Achilles’ refusal to assist his friends or heed the speech of a member of his own household. 
Jasper Griffin (1980:74, n.46) appropriately remarks that “it is surely made clear by Achilles that 
it is not his ‘ethic’ that prevents his return, but on the contrary his own passionate emotion, 
overriding a code which for him, as for other heroes, made his return the appropriate action.”52 
Achilles’ inaction, in Wilson’s words (2002:108), “signals dissolution of familial and friendship 
bonds and even of civilized existence.” The poet, through Achilles’ refusal to follow the normal 
narrative trajectory, highlights the significance of the present narrative moment. What follows, 
moreover, on the next day of fighting, as the audience who have heard the story before know, is 
not just devastation for the Achaeans whom Achilles refuses to assist in his recalcitrance, but also 
devastation for Achilles, who will lose his dearest companion.53
 2) A second break in the traditional narrative trajectory suggested by the missed “stricken 
to silence” metonym is found after the recurrence of the formula at Odyssey 20.320. The setting 
now is the palace of Odysseus after the unimpeded progress of the suitors in their hubristic and 
wanton behavior. Most recently, the suitor Ktessipus has hurled an ox’s hoof at  Odysseus 
disguised as a beggar. Telemachus is of course well aware that it is Odysseus that Ktessipus has 
nearly hit, yet it affords him a moment to warn the suitors to cease their rude action and to affirm 
that he has come of age and will tolerate it no longer (20.304-19). Following the “stricken to 
silence” formula and a familiar formulaic line of delay (20.321; cf. Il. 7.94), the external 
audience expects the response of the suitor Agelaus (20.322-37) to be authoritative. 
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50 For a detailed consideration of Phoenix’s crucial speech, see Rosner 1976 and Held 1987. 
51 “Great thumos” (θυμὸν  μέγαν),  filling the colon B2 to C2, seems to be the poet’s adaptation of the more 
traditional epithet,  “great-hearted thumos” (μεγαλήτορα θυμόν), employed only in the last colon, from C1 to line 
end. See note 47 above.
52 Cf. Collins 1988:29, n.6.
53  Achilles’  decision not to accept Phoenix’s speech as authoritative, if read from the perspective of Ruth 
Scodel’s thesis about Achilles’ word (1989),  may be seen to have come at the point when he first made his grievous 
promise not to fight until fire reached his ships.  Considering the isolated position of his ships “detached from the 
rest of the fleet” (C. Parry 1817:340),  however, this promise was destined from the moment given to provide neither 
meaningful nor timely assistance to his friends, nor a reasonable or merciful response to the pleas of any future 
embassy.
 Agelaus’ response (20.322-37) is quite supportive of Telemachus’ concern. In the first 
part of his reply, he contends that Telemachus has spoken justly and joins him in advocating non-
violence, admonishing the suitors to treat guests and servants with respect (20.322-25):
ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν δή τις ἐπὶ ῥηθέντι δικαίῳ
ἀντιβίοισ’ ἐπέεσσι καθαπτόμενος χαλεπαίνοι· 
μήτε τι τὸν ξεῖνον στυφελίζετε μήτε τιν’ ἄλλον 
δμώων, οἳ κατὰ δώματ’ Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο. 
Friends, indeed no one should, in response to what has been said in justice,
assail him with harsh, opposing words.
Do not continually maltreat either the stranger or any other male
slave who is in the household of godlike Odysseus.
These same conciliatory and agreeable words were used by the poet already in his story within 
Book 18 (414-17), after Eurymachus had hurled a stool at Odysseus disguised as a beggar, and a 
common thread has been observed joining the two incidents: “In each case the poet has made one 
of the ‘better’ suitors acknowledge the validity  of Telemachus’ complaint” (Russo et al. 
1992:123). 
 The second part of Agelaus’ authoritative response appends a polite advisement 
(20.326-37), with his counsel beginning by  acknowledging the propriety  of Penelope’s refusal to 
consider a marriage when there was still hope that Odysseus would return. That return day, 
according to Agelaus, is now past. The poet has Agelaus provide a call to action, for Telemachus 
to explain to his mother that she should marry the best man. 
 Following a chiastic pattern, the second part of Agelaus’ speech first finds confirmation 
of its authoritative nature in the immediate reply of Telemachus himself, who affirms that he has 
in fact already urged his mother to marry  whomever she wishes (20.341-42).54  The first part of 
the speech directed toward his fellow suitors, however, is quite another matter. What follows is 
anything but a clear affirmation by the group to change their insensitive and hubristic behavior as 
Agelaus has advised. Their impious behavior begins with veiled threats toward the prophet 
Theoclymenus, who has just uttered a foreboding interpretation of the suitors’ own perilous 
dilemma (20.351-57). It continues with attempted provocation (ἐριθίζω, 20.374) directed 
towards Telemachus from each of the suitors (20.374, 384), threatening the very guest that 
Agelaus had advised them not to maltreat, but now also openly  advising abusive behavior against 
the prophet himself (20.381-83): 
ἀλλ’ εἴ μοί τι πίθοιο, τό κεν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη· 
τοὺς ξείνους ἐν νηῒ πολυκλήϊδι βαλόντες 
ἐς Σικελοὺς πέμψωμεν, ὅθεν κέ τοι ἄξιον ἄλφοι.
 STRICKEN TO SILENCE 511
54 Telemachus, for the sake of the imminent revenge, also goes along with the first assumption mentioned 
by Agelaus, that Odysseus is now dead. 
But if perhaps you would listen to me, the following idea seems more advantageous: 
let’s load these guests into a many-benched ship 
and send them to the Sicilians, where some profit might accrue to you!
 The context for the suitors’ reply, now that the response of Agelaus has been deprived of 
any efficacy, is a bizarre picture of a topsy-turvy, apocalyptic threat  to the suitors’ reality, at least 
as visualized through the prophet’s narrative perspective (20.351-57). The prophetic visualization 
follows the poet’s own grizzly introduction (20.347-49), as the ambience of the hall and the food 
being eaten by the suitors changes to portend imminent destruction: laughter is heard as lament, 
walls bleed, specters fill the courtyard, and darkness blankets the place. It is as though the natural 
order of the physical realm has been upset by the suitors’ moral decadence, their imminent doom 
and descent to Hades proleptically portrayed.
 The suitors seem blind to any reality  check and haughtiness is their only response, 
evident not only in their suggestion to sell Telemachus’ guests to the Sicilians as slaves (Russo et 
al. 1992:126), but also in their treatment of others in the narrative that immediately  follows. The 
suitors as a group  seem incapable of comprehending the authoritative response of their fellow 
suitor, Agelaus. They appear incognizant of the dark foreboding of their present position signaled 
by the grim portents of the prophet Theoclymenus. Destruction looms. Further, the “stricken to 
silence” formula, clearly  operative in all fourteen cases considered earlier and controlling of the 
actions and attitudes of those who attend each authoritative speech, is here, as in the case of 
Achilles, not controlling the outcome. What is the poet doing?
Metonymic Irony of Narrative Perspective
The mechanism that the poet uses in the last two instances of the “stricken to silence” 
formula we have considered is metonymic irony of narrative perspective. Metonymic irony is by 
far the most traditional type of irony, since it operates at the level of the audience’s knowledge of 
the greater story  tradition. As outlined earlier in our consideration of metonymy, formulae, when 
encountered, must be read by reference to their use within the tradition; the audience informed 
by the tradition can thus access the meaning of metonyms in the text because they share a body 
of knowledge that  is their cultural inheritance. Within the poet’s narrative, the use of formula as 
metonym for the creation of narrative content relies inevitably  upon the audience, who are, in 
some sense, co-authors through the tradition of the full story being told. Their traditional 
knowledge, consequently, is assumed by the poet in the creation of irony. 
In the last two cases we have considered, the response of Achilles and then the suitors, 
metonymic irony starts to form at the phraseological level, where the external audience 
experiences each instance of the “stricken to silence” formula without the normal meaning 
inherent in its employment, and realizes that something is wrong. The traditional implications of 
the formula are suspended. In each case, a part or most of the internal audience (Achilles and the 
suitors, respectively) is not stricken by the sort  of silence that produces respect for the 
authoritative response of the group (as in the other fourteen examples from the Iliad and 
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Odyssey).55  This instant is the temporal beginning of irony, and, since the employment and 
reading of the “stricken to silence” formula deals with a form of lexical ambiguity, it  is this 
moment that is closest to traditional “rhetorical” irony.56 
 The ironic instant in narrative time, however, is in no way restricted to the question of the 
ambiguity  of language, but rather, is intricately  bound to the external audience’s superior position 
and knowledge as auditors of a traditional story.57  Consequently, irony is fully  achieved both 
through the missed metonym of the language cue and the narrative perspective created by the 
poet. It is found in the juxtaposition of the awareness of the external audience of the normal path 
of the “stricken to silence” metonym gained from familiarity with the traditional language and 
story patterns, set against  the intractable stubbornness, blindness, and ignorance of the internal 
audience with regard to the true significance of the authoritative speech that follows the silence 
formula.58  When the external audience first sees Achilles and then the suitors deaf to the pleas 
and warnings of others, intractable and unheeding of the speech that follows the silence, they 
sense that something is wrong. They recognize that the normal trajectory of the metonym has 
been broken by characters acting from a limited perspective within the action of each plot. 
The effect of metonymic irony of narrative perspective is an intensification of suspense in 
each of the two moments in the poets’ rendition of the traditional epic stories.59  The external 
audience, informed by  the traditional use of the language cue, feels the jarring resilience of both 
Achilles and the suitors against what should be the authoritative speech of Phoenix and the suitor 
Agelaus respectively. A sense of foreboding is felt, and peril looms large in the auditors’ minds 
as they think of what will follow in the future: Achilles will lose his closest comrade and the 
suitors will die as a consequence of the direction they are taking at this juncture in Homer’s 
story. 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
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55  For a formative example of metonymic irony in Homer beginning at the phraseological level, compare 
Foley’s comments about “sweet sleep” (1999:232). For the development of irony in various disciplines beyond the 
limited use of the term in early classical sources, see Kierkegaard 1965 [1841], Muecke 1970, Enright 1986, Dane 
1991, Stringfellow 1994, and Colebrook 2002. 
56 Since the internal audience, unlike the external audience, cannot hear the formula, but only the silence, 
we do not have here an actual case of rhetorical irony for the internal audience, as it is normally described. (See 
Stanford 1939:1-11, among others) 
57  The prophet Halitherses, no doubt also aware of the portentousness of the moment through prophetic 
inspiration, acts as an exception, and consequently can be seen to join the gods,  poet, and external audience in 
viewing events from an elevated narrative perspective.
58  Compare the comments of D. C. Muecke (1970:44) about “dramatic” irony: “The greater the contrast 
between, on the one hand, the victim’s confident assumption that he is a free agent and that things will happen as he 
expects them to and, on the other, the spectator’s view of him as a blind wretch fixed to the wheel of an irreversible, 
unstoppable action, the more intense the irony.” The internal audience does not hear the formula nor understand the 
metonymic implications, although it does hear the peculiar silence and the authoritative response speech, and in the 
case of Achilles and the suitors, that part of the narrative cue is ignored. The mechanism causing failure to heed the 
authoritative speech may be “delusion” (ἄτη),  possibly part of Achilles’, but definitely part of the suitors’ (for 
example, Od. 18.143, 20.170, and so forth) condition. On Achilles’ “unreal view of reality” see Arieti 1985:198; see 
Scodel 1989:93 and Redfield 1975:106 for views that do not find Achilles to be the cause of the moral dilemma.
59 On suspense in Homer see Morrison 1992.
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